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Abstract
With a few notable exceptions, corporate finance studies of firms’ financial policies
typically rely on a single firm setting, thus overlooking the possibility that firms’ finan-
cial policies are co-determined by those of their rivals. I develop and test a model in
which firms interact by buying and selling productive assets. This interaction affects
cash policies because a lack of cash may force a firm to sell assets at a discount, while
having surplus cash may enable a firm to take advantage of other firms’ asset sales.
The model generates sharp and novel empirical predictions at the industry (as opposed
to the individual firm) level. I test these predictions using a carefully built methodol-
ogy that tackles the endogeneity and persistence of firm-level determinants. Precisely
as predicted by the theory, I find that both the average cash holdings in an indus-
try, as well as the heterogeneity in cash policies within that industry, depend on two
variables: the asset specificity of that industry and industry cashflow volatility. These
results point to the importance of strategic interaction as a determinant of corporate
financial policies.
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1 Introduction
Most of the corporate finance literature uses a single-firm framework to analyze a firm’s
decision making process1. This framework ignores strategic interactions among firms, thus
overlooking the potentially important feature that firms’ financial policies are co-determined
by those of their rivals. I develop and test a model of joint determination of financial policies
in which firms interact by buying and selling productive assets.
A central aim of corporate financial policy is to provide future financial flexibility, a point
stressed by managers surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001). One policy particularly
associated with the concept of flexibility is the management of cash holdings. I offer an
equilibrium model of cash holdings where firms interact by buying and selling assets, and
find flexibility important because external funds may be more costly in the future. Since
internal cash reserves and asset sales are alternative sources of funding, the price of assets
affects the benefits of carrying cash. The price of assets is determined by the supply and
demand for productive assets, which are, in turn, a function of potential buyers’ and sellers’
cash holdings. Therefore, optimal cash policies are interdependent. This theory generates
sharp and novel predictions about industry patterns in cash holdings. Crucially, the unit of
analysis shifts from the individual firm of the single-firm framework, to the industry as a
whole. In equilibrium, the model shows that both average cash holdings in an industry, as
well as the heterogeneity in cash policies within that industry, depend on two variables: the
asset specificity of that industry, and industry cashflow volatility.
I carry out a detailed empirical analysis of the model’s predictions concerning industry-wide
patterns in cash holdings. The tests are performed after accounting for effects unrelated to
firm interaction by using a carefully developed methodology that tackles the endogeneity
and persistence of some determinants. Precisely as the theory predicts, I find that average
cash in an industry depends on that industry’s asset specificity, industry cashflow volatility,
and their arithmetic product. The theory about heterogeneity in cash policies within an
industry is strongly backed by the data as well. All the effects are found to be statistically
and economically significant. Additional evidence from mergers and acquisitions shows that
asset specificity affects average levels of industry cash via asset sales.
After this quick overview of the main plot, let me elaborate on both the theoretical and
empirical investigation.
To understand in greater depth the theory of how strategic interaction influences optimal
cash policies, consider a scenario where, in the spirit of Keynes (1936), firms carry cash both
1One exception is the literature on the effects of product market competition. See, e.g., Brander and Lewis
(1986), Maksimovic and Titman (1991), Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995), Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman
(2006), Kovenock and Phillips (1997), Campello (2003), and the discussion below.
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to lower the likelihood of forced asset liquidations because of financial distress and to be
able to buy assets of other firms that may be distressed. In the presence of market frictions
that limit access to outside financing, lack of cash may force a firm into distress sales of
its assets, while having surplus cash may enable a firm to take advantage of another firm’s
distressed sales instead. Ultimately, however, the costs of financial distress and the return
on investments that a firm obtains by buying other firms’ assets both depend on the price of
those assets. A high price reduces the costs of financial distress and also reduces the return
for a firm buying distressed assets, thus reducing the incentives to carry cash. Similarly,
a low price increases the incentives to carry cash. But the price itself is endogenous and
depends on supply and demand, which means that it depends on the cash holdings of all the
firms in the industry.
In addition, the price of assets—and thus, the incentives for a firm to hold cash—may be
affected by potential demand for assets from outside the industry. This demand depends
on how “specific” the assets are in the sense of Williamson (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1992). The lower the degree of specificity of an industry’s assets, the greater the number
of potential outside buyers, and the lower the incentive to carry cash. Thus, in equilibrium,
the average cash in an industry increases with that industry’s asset specificity.
The cash available to a firm depends on cash reserves carried over from the previous period, as
well as on current cashflow from operations. Further, since industry-wide shocks to cashflow
affect all firms in the industry in the same fashion, the price of productive assets increases
with industry-wide shocks. However, the effects of the future industry cashflow shocks on
ex-ante incentives to carry cash are complex. An increase in industry cashflow volatility
leads to an increase in the average size of both positive and negative shocks, which increases
prices in industry upturns and decreases them in downturns. The overall impact of the
change in volatility on the incentives to carry cash depends on the relative strengths of these
two opposing effects. However, one of the two depends much more on asset specificity than
the other—the lower is the valuation of assets to outsiders, the lower the prices can go in
downturns. Given an increase in industry cashflow volatility, the higher the asset specificity
is, the higher are the ex-ante benefits of carrying cash. Thus, in equilibrium, the average
cash level in an industry increases in the arithmetic product between asset specificity and
industry cashflow volatility.
A second key set of results stems from the fact that firms from the same industry choose,
in some settings, to carry different amounts of cash, even though they are ex-ante identical.
To understand why, start by assuming that firms follow a similar cash policy and there is an
important common component in cashflow, making firms likely to survive or default together.
Due to similar cash policies and cashflows, a firm choosing to carry less cash defaults not
only in the states in which all other firms in an industry default, but also in some states when
all other firms survive. Yet, the surviving firms’ resources insure that default in the latter
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case is costless for the firm and that survival generates no benefit from buying cheap assets.
Hence, the low-cash firm is better off than all others, since it saves the cost of carrying cash
without incurring an increase in default costs, nor a loss of investment opportunities.
In equilibrium, identical firms separate into two basic groups—those that carry high levels
of cash and those that carry lower levels. This heterogeneity in cash policies acts as a hedge
for firms against the common fate of either default or survival that would be induced by
the commonality of cashflow in that industry. Additionally, as the valuation to outsiders
decreases, the disincentives to survive or default together are stronger, and firms find greater
benefit from carrying different levels of cash. Hence, the variability of cash policies within
an industry increases with industry cashflow volatility and with industry asset specificity.
I test the empirical predictions of my theory to provide evidence about the effects of firms’
interaction on their financial structures. In order to prove the presence of the effects, the
patterns in firm financial structure should be observable after accounting for the determinants
predicted by theoretical models that lack the interaction feature. To account for these other
determinants, I consider a dynamic model of cash that includes these determinants along a
set of industry dummies.
The estimation poses several econometric challenges. The endogeneity of the common
cash determinants (capital expenditures, leverage, etc.), combined with the presence of lag
cash, renders the standard ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects, or Fama-Macbeth
approaches inappropriate.2 To overcome these challenges, I estimate the model using a two-
step dynamic panel data methodology based on Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano
and Bond (1991). First, I consistently estimate the coefficients on the time-varying en-
dogenous variables using a first difference approach coupled with instrumentation with their
lags. Second, I estimate the coefficients on time-invariant variables (including, importantly,
the industry dummies) through an OLS regression of the first-step errors on the respective
variables.
The industry dummies play an important role in the actual tests of the interaction theory.
Since the theory relates cash to two industry-level variables, the industry dummies should
capture, among others, any empirical effects of the theory that are unexplained by control
variables. In order to test the hypotheses about patterns in industry averages of cash, I use
the set of dummy coefficients as the dependent variable in a cross-sectional regression on
asset specificity, cashflow volatility, and their arithmetic product.
To measure asset specificity, I use three accounting-based proxies. While Williamson (1988)
argues for the development of better measures of asset specificity than the accounting-based
ones, that challenge is beyond the scope of this article. The motivation for employing the first
2SeeWilliam Greene notes at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/∼wgreene/Econometrics/PanelDataEconometrics.htm
and Jennifer Smith notes at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/jennifersmith/panel/
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measure comes from Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), who show that firms do not branch into
industries in which they cannot efficiently use their assets. Therefore, industries where there
are more single-segment firms have higher asset specificity. The second and third measures
capture the idea that, of all assets operated by a firm, intangibles are the hardest to value,
are the most difficult for firms from other industries to understand, and the most challenging
to integrate with processes in other industries.
I find that the behavior of average industry cash holdings is positively related to asset
specificity, as theorized. When cashflow volatility is at its mean, the marginal increase in
cash holdings generated by a one standard-deviation increase in asset specificity is around
2.5% of asset value. This effect is comparable to the median firm cash holdings of 6.7%.
The product of asset specificity and cashflow volatility is significant for two out of three
measures. In these cases, a one-standard-deviation increase in both asset specificity and
cashflow volatility leads to a 1% increase in industry cash due to the interaction term.
Moreover, the explanatory power of the model is significant. While lag cash and firm-specific
variables explain 11% of cash variation, the effects due to firm interaction explain approxi-
mately one-quarter of what the interaction-unrelated variables explain. This is particularly
noteworthy, given that asset specificity and cashflow volatility are measured at the industry
level and, thus, so much more coarsely than the firm-year level for the other determinants.
The second set of tests concerns the effects of the interaction on the intra-industry variability
in cash. The tests are based on a measure of intra-industry variability that is constructed
as the difference between the top and bottom quintiles of within-industry residuals from the
empirical model. The test consists of regressing this range measurement on asset specificity
and industry cashflow volatility.
The hypothesis about the intra-industry variability in cash is strongly confirmed in all tests.
A one standard-deviation increase in asset specificity leads to an absolute increase of 5%
in the difference between the first- and fifth-quintile cash-to-net assets ratio, while a one
standard-deviation increase in cashflow volatility leads to a 3% increase in the same dif-
ference. The model explains almost half of the variation across industries in the range of
cash level between an industry’s top and bottom firms. The confirmation of this hypothesis,
which is natural only to a framework with interaction among firms, strongly supports the
case for the joint determination of firm financial policies based on their interaction.
Even though the theory is presented in terms of cash and it abstracts from the choice of debt
policies, firms employ cash and debt capacity for similar purposes. Thus, similar arguments
can be made about optimal debt capacity given interaction among firms. Empirically, I
expect that industry net debt is negatively related to asset specificity and to its arithmetic
product with industry cashflow volatility. Moreover, the intra-industry variability in net
debt should be positively related to asset specificity and to industry cashflow volatility.
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The effect of asset specificity on industry net debt is twice as strong as its effect on cash.
The results show that the interaction among firms has a strong effect not only on cash but
on debt as well. These results contrast partially with Benmelech (2005), who uses a sample
of railroads to show that asset salability affects debt maturities, but not debt levels.
My theoretical model provides additional predictions about the market for productive assets.
Using mergers and acquisitions data, I test some of these predictions across industries. Con-
sistent with my theory, I find that, for sales to firms from the same industry, the decrease in
the price-to-book value of the target from industry upturns versus downturns is positively
related to the industry’s asset specificity. In addition, the average cash in an industry is a
function of this decrease in price-to-book, but its explanatory power disappears when asset
specificity and industry cashflow volatility are added to the model. These results show that
the link between cash and the decrease in price-to-book exists because both depend on asset
specificity.
A driving assumption of my theoretical framework is the existence of external financing
constraints. Absent these constraints, there are clearly no incentives for a firm to hold cash.
In the theoretical literature, there have been efforts to derive the existence of constraints
in an incomplete-contracting framework (see, e.g., Hart and Moore (1994), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997)). The empirical case for their existence and for their effect on firm financial
and investment policies is much stronger, and it has been recently documented by, among
others, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Rauh (2006), and Faulkender and Petersen
(2006). See Hubbard (1998) for a review of the earlier literature.
The above theoretical framework follows the intuition of Shleifer and Vishny (1992)’s treat-
ment of optimal leverage in the presence of interaction between two firms. I enrich their
framework to include a continuum of firms and normally distributed—and possibly correlated—
cashflows. This richer structure generates a more complex equilibrium. I am able to charac-
terize the equilibrium extensively, which allows me, in contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1992),
to derive sharp and novel empirical predictions about what patterns should be observed in
optimal financial structures due to strategic interaction.
Some of the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) about the types of buyers and sellers
of assets, and about prices are tested by Pulvino (1998). He shows that in the airline
industry, during downturns, outsiders are more likely to buy assets, and prices are lower
than in normal times. Moreover, Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2006) show that during
industry downturns, bond recovery rates depend on the asset specificity of the industry.
My paper is also related to the literature on asset sales. Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996)
show that, out of all assets, long-term assets are sold for the deepest discount relative to
their book value. The interaction among firms in the market for productive assets has been
extensively analyzed theoretically and empirically in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002).
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Other studies on asset sales are referenced in these articles.
Another strand of literature on the interdependence of financial policies considers interactions
via product markets. A partial list of theoretical work includes Brander and Lewis (1986),
Maksimovic (1988), Maksimovic and Titman (1991), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), and
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995). Recently, Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2006) explain
what industry-wide patterns in hedging decisions are generated by strategic interaction.
Empirical tests have been carried out, among others, by Chevalier (1995), Phillips (1995),
Kovenock and Phillips (1997), and Campello (2003).
The literature on the determinants of cash in a non-interaction framework includes theoretical
works by Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr (1966), and recently by Kim, Mauer, and
Sherman (1998). Extensive evidence on the firm-level determinants of cash is presented by
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999). Other cash holdings explanations tested
are: taxes (Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2006)), corporate governance (Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes (2003), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), Kalcheva and Lins (2005),
and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006)), and free cashflow (Harford (1999)). Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) consider the theoretical effects of costly external financing on
a more general set of policies associated with financial flexibility. Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello (2005) explore the joint determination of cash and debt policies. Other recent
works pertaining to cash policies are Mikkelson and Partch (2003), Faleye (2004), Bates
(2005), and Faulkender and Wang (2006).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the theory, section 3 deals with data issues,
section 4 presents the empirical evidence, and section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory
I consider a two-period financing and investing model where agents from an industry carry
cash both to avoid distress and to buy the assets of firms that are distressed. Each agent has
one unit of a productive asset that generates cashflows each period. The random intermediate
cashflow, together with the cash carried over, determine whether the firm survives or must
sell its assets. Prospective buyers are either surviving firms or firms from outside the industry,
with the latter having a lower valuation of assets than the former. The price of assets is
determined by supply and demand. Each firm chooses how much cash to hold such that it
maximizes firm value given the cash holdings policies of the other firms.
This framework may potentially generate both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. There-
fore the issues of equilibrium existence and uniqueness become non-trivial. Further, any set
of empirical predictions must hold over a wide range of settings, and these settings may
result in different types of equilibrium.
2.1 Setup
The industry consists of a continuum of identical firms with measure one. Each industry
insider α ∈ [0, 1] is endowed with one unit of a productive asset, infinitely divisible, that
generates cashflows at t = 1 and 2. At t = 0 all units of the asset are owned by insiders.
For each α, the cashflow at t = 1 (Fα) is random and has 3 components: mean µ, an industry-
wide, systematic component σyz, and a firm specific, idiosyncratic component σxzα, where
z is independent of zα, and zα is independent across α.
Fα = µ+ σyz + σxzα where z, zα ∼ IIDN [0, 1]
The systematic cashflow volatility is given by σy and the idiosyncratic volatility by σx.
Therefore, the volatility of industry cashflow is σy and the correlation between a firm’s
cashflow and industry cashflow is
√
σ2y/(σ
2
y + σ
2
x). Further, if at t = 0 insiders have debt D1
due at t = 1, then without loss of generality, we may replace µ by µ−D1 and assume that
short-term debt is 0.
At time 2, the asset pays 1 if it is used by an inside firm, or L < 1 if it is used by outside
firms. The cashflow at t = 2 introduces the valuation differential between an insider and an
outsider, namely the “specificity” of the asset. The lower L is, the higher the asset specificity
in that industry. Since all firms in the industry have a similar asset, asset specificity is an
industry-level characteristic.
Insiders decide to hold cash c from t = 0 to t = 1, which is either raised from risk-neutral
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investors or carried over from previous periods. Carrying cash c has a cost of ξ(c) = ξc2/2
for the firm. The cost may arise from managers’ investing in negative NPV projects.
Various frictions make external financing impossible or unreliable and carrying cash at-
tractive. While in my model I assume the external financing restrictions, there have been
theoretical efforts to justify them in incomplete contracting frameworks. For example, Hart
and Moore (1994) show that due to the inalienability of human capital, firms cannot real-
istically pledge more than the liquidation value of a project. Otherwise, the entrepreneur
may threaten to withdraw his human capital and renegotiate the payments. Moreover, the
model of moral hazard in project choice of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) implies limited
pledgeability. When project choice cannot be specified contractually, entrepreneurs have to
get a high enough fraction of cashflows to induce them to choose the most profitable project.
Lastly, Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) show that when cashflows are not verifiable,
firms may prefer internal financing to external one.
Empirically, there is significant evidence that these constraints exist and they have a strong
impact on the firm financial and investment policies. An additional justification comes from
Servaes and Tufano (2006): the CFOs they survey mention concerns about the availability
of external financing when needed as one of the main reasons to hold cash.
I incorporate external frictions in my model by restricting insiders’ access to external fi-
nancing at t = 1. The worse the industry shock is, the more this restriction affects a firm
investment capacity. This is comforting, since the main theoretical justifications for financing
constraints are more natural to industry down states: high asymmetric information between
investors and managers, or managers engaging in asset substitution.
A possible way to endogenize the financing restrictions is to allow firms to pledge only the
liquidation value of assets. Casted in a multi-period framework, this mechanism strengthens
the constraints via a multiplier effect, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
The assumption that even insiders with a positive amount of cash are restricted may be
too harsh. I relax this assumption in Appendix A by allowing project financing, or partial
pledgeability of newly acquired assets.
Given the financing constraints, at t = 1 insiders default if the cash retained from t = 0 and
the period’s cashflows are not enough to meet firm’s obligations: F + c < 0. When firms
default, their assets are sold at a uniform price auction. There are two types of buyers for
the assets: surviving insiders and outsiders. Insiders can use only the cash on hand (F + c)
to buy distressed assets due to external financing constraints. The outsiders are assumed
to be numerous, thus even though each one may be partially constrained, as a group they
always have enough resources to pay their reservation value L for any amount of assets.
Since firms are identical ex ante, I start by investigating symmetric equilibria. A symmetric
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equilibrium is a set {c, p(F1)}, where c is the time 0 cash policy of all firms and p(F1) is the
time 1 distressed assets pricing functional. An insider firm must attain its maximum value
at time 0 when it holds c in cash, given that all other firms in the industry hold c in cash
and prices at time 1 are given by p. Price p must be such that markets clear at t = 1, given
the realization of t = 1 cashflows and that all firms in the industry save c in cash.
2.2 Solution
I proceed by deriving the form of the pricing functional and the firm’s objective function,
allowing for the existence of asymmetric equilibria. I obtain a closed-form expression for
first-order condition (FOC), but I must solve it numerically.
Prices
Lemma 1. Let insider α have cash c1α at t = 1. Let c¯
1 =
∫
α
1c1α≥0c
1
αdα be the total cash
available to surviving insiders. The aggregate demand function is:
D(p) =

0 if p > 1
[0, c¯1] if p = 1
c¯1/p if L < p < 1
[c¯1/L, ∞) if p = L
∞ if p < L
(1)
The aggregate supply does not depend on p and is given by S =
∫
α
1c1α≤0dα
Lemma 1 gives the form of the demand and supply. Each buyer bids as long as the price
is less or equal to the t = 2 cashflow it receives from those assets. Insiders use all available
cash to buy as long as price is less than 1. Outsiders have a lower valuation, so they bid as
long as price is L or less. One assumption I use is that when both insiders and outsiders
have bids at the same price, insiders have priority.
The supply quantity of distressed assets is given by all defaulted firms; thus it does not
depend on prices. Given the form of the supply and demand functions, I can solve for p once
I determine S and c¯1.
Lemma 2. Prices depend on the information available at t = 1 (i.e., F1) and are given by
p(F1) = max
(
L,min
(
1,
Available Cash
Amount Distressed Assets
))
(2)
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If there is a symmetric equilibrium, let c¯ be the cash saved at time 0 by each insider. Then
p depends on z and c¯, and
Available Cash = N
[
c¯+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
(c¯+ µ+ σyz) + φ
[
c¯+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
σx (2.1)
Amount Distressed Assets = 1−N
[
c¯+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
(2.2)
Lemma 2 gives the general form of prices. Moreover, when all firms hold the same amount
of cash, prices depend only on the unique cash policy and the systematic shock to cashflow
z. Given c¯, for low enough z, prices are L, and for high enough z prices are 1. In between
the two bounds, prices increase strictly in z.
Firm optimum
When the firm survives (F + c > 0) and p < 1, it buys F+c
p
units of assets and the total
payoff at t = 2 is 1+ F+c
p
. In case p = 1, the firm may have some cash not invested in assets.
I assume that it invests this in a riskless technology that has a NPV = 0, making the total
payoff at t = 2 equal to 1 + F+c
p
.
When the firm fails (F + c < 0), it sells its assets at p and the total payoff at t = 1 is
F + c+ p.
The firm raises cash c at time 0 from risk-neutral investors. The setup is isomorphic with an
alternative where the firm has a large amount of cash from previous periods and it decides
how much to keep and how much to distribute to shareholders.
Given pricing functional p(F1), the firm solves the following problem at t = 0:
max
c≥0
f(c, p) = EF
[
1F+c>0
(
1 +
F + c
p
)
+ 1F+c<0(F + c+ p)
]
−ξ(c)−E[PayoutForCashRaised]
Given fair pricing at t = 0 for any cash raised at this point, E[PayoutForCashRaised] = c
and the problem simplifies to
max
c≥0
f(c, p) = EF
[
1F+c>0(F + c)
(
1
p
− 1
)
+ 1F+c<0(p− 1)
]
+ µ+ 1− ξ(c)
Using the definition of F , noting that p does not depend on the idiosyncratic shock zα and
integrating over zα, we get:
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max
c≥0
f(c, p) = Ez
[(
N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
(c+ µ+ σyz) + φ
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
σx
)
1− p(F1)
p(F1) −
−
(
1−N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
])
(1− p(F1))
]
+ µ+ 1− ξ(c) (3)
N [·] and φ[·] are the usual normal density functions. Note that the firm cares about other
firms’ cash only inasmuch as it affects prices.
Noting that the firm is a price-taker, I get the FOC by differentiating (3) with respect to c:
0 = fc(c, p) = Ez
[
N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
1− p(F1)
p(F1) +
1
σx
φ
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
(1− p(F1))
]
− ξc (4)
The FOC (4) is true for all types of equilibria, as long as some firms hold c in equilibrium.
The FOC show that the marginal benefits to cash depend on the probability that the firm
is in distress, the amount of money it has if it is not, and on the price of assets. The form of
the value function agrees with the intuition that the characteristics of other firms affect the
firm through the price of assets. This fact would be more transparent in a more elaborate
version of the model, where firms are heterogeneous ex-ante. In an additional effect, the
value function depends directly on the distribution of the industry shock, but that is not to
be confused with a direct connection with other firms’ properties. This effect is due to firms
having a similar production function.
2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
I characterize the equilibrium based on theoretical results derived in Appendix A. When
theoretical results are not available, I use numerical solutions based on various reasonable sets
of parameters. First, I investigate the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium,
the natural type of equilibrium in this setup. Second, I investigate the form, existence and
uniqueness of asymmetric equilibria, and focus on the two-strategy one.
Given the fact that there are a continuum of identical firms, there is no distinction between
pure-strategy asymmetric equilibrium and mixed-strategy symmetric equilibrium. For con-
sistency, I will use only the first term. In a more general setup where firms are heterogeneous,
the two types of equilibria may be different.
An important issue is the existence of multiple equilibria for the same economy. Based on
my numerical investigations, the symmetric and two-strategy equilibria do not exist simul-
taneously and, moreover, when they exist they are unique among their class. Regarding
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other possible equilibria, my conjecture is that they do not exist in non-degenerate cases.
For an n-strategy equilibrium to exist, the firm objective function must have n local optima.
I did not find any combination of parameters (including off-equilibrium distributions in cash
policies) that results in an objective function with more than two local optima. In fact, there
are cases when the equilibrium is symmetric, yet the value function has two local optima.
Given that value functions with two local optima are quite common even for equilibria that
do not have two strategies, while value functions with more than two optima are not, it is
difficult to entertain the possibility that asymmetric equilibria with more than two strategies
are possible.
Symmetric equilibrium
To get optimum cash policy c∗ given a symmetric equilibrium, I solve the FOC (4) for
c∗ = c = c¯ and p given by (2.1) − (2.2). In the symmetric case p is a function of z and c¯
only. The exact numerical algorithm is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. (a) Any symmetric equilibrium c∗ satisfies (4) for c∗ = c = c¯ and p(z, c¯)
given by (2.1) − (2.2). The necessary and sufficient condition for the solution c∗ to (4)
to be an equilibrium is to be a global maximum: f(c, p(z, c∗)) < f(c∗, p(z, c∗)) for any
c ≥ 0, c 6= c∗
(b) When it exists, the symmetric equilibrium is unique among the class of symmetric equi-
libria.
(c) If σx > 0, there is systematic volatility σ¯y such that a symmetric equilibrium exists if
σy ≤ σ¯y. Moreover, σ¯y increases in L (the reverse of asset specificity)
Proposition 1.c states that a symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if the systematic
uncertainty is low enough. Albeit in this case it may exists also asymmetric equilibria, the
symmetric equilibrium is unique. In fact, we shall see in the next section that a certain
type of asymmetric equilibria can be ruled out when symmetric equilibria exist. Further,
the threshold systematic volatility separating the symmetric from asymmetric equilibria, is
decreasing in asset specificity.
For the special case, presented in Appendix A, of no systematic uncertainty, the results
concerning existence and uniqueness can be strengthened. When σy = 0, there always exists
an equilibrium and that equilibrium is unique and symmetric. The uniqueness is not only
among symmetric equilibria, but among all possible equilibria.
The symmetric equilibrium generates interesting, empirically testable, comparative statics
of the optimal cash policy with respect to the key and novel model parameters, namely asset
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specificity and systematic cashflow volatility. I obtain the results numerically and check
them over a sensible range of parameters—see Figure 1.
Proposition 2. When symmetric equilibrium exists
(a)
dc∗
dL < 0 The ratio of industry cash holdings to industry net assets is positively related
to asset specificity
(b)
d2c∗
dLdσy
< 0 The ratio of industry cash holdings to industry net assets is positively
related to the product of asset specificity and industry cashflow volatility
The link between asset specificity and optimal cash is intuitive and straightforward: An
increase in asset specificity means a downward shift in some parts of the demand curve,
decreasing prices in some states and increasing the incentives to hold cash.
Systematic cashflow volatility affects the incentives to carry cash differently depending on
the direction of the systematic cashflow shock. In the case of a positive shock, firms are
doing fairly well and demand for assets is high while supply is low, which makes carrying
cash unattractive. Given a positive shock, the higher the systematic volatility, the lower the
marginal benefits of cash. The converse argument can be made for a negative systematic
shock: It increases the marginal benefits of cash, generating a positive relationship between
the systematic volatility and optimal cash. Ex ante, at time 0, it is unclear what the
dominating effect of an increase in systematic cashflow volatility on optimal cash is.
The unambiguous cross-effect of the two variables on optimal cash stems from the difference
in how they interact, conditional on the direction of the systematic shock. With a negative
shock, the valuation to outsiders has a high probability of affecting prices, since insiders’
cash is likely not enough to buy all distressed assets at high prices. The higher the asset
specificity, the lower the prices can go in case of a bad shock, and the effect of asset specificity
and systematic volatility compound each other, generating a positive cross effect on optimal
cash. In the case of a positive shock, the valuation by outsiders is unlikely to play any role
in pricing, hence there would be no cross effect. Thus, any contribution of the two variables
to the cross effect comes from the states when the industry is facing a negative shock.
Asymmetric equilibrium
The results from the previous section show that a symmetric equilibrium may not always
exist. Next, I investigate the existence and properties of asymmetric equilibria. In an
asymmetric equilibrium, firms separate into different groups and each group follows its own
cash policy, yet firms are optimally indifferent about choosing to what group to belong. The
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equilibrium definition must be changed accordingly (see Appendix A) to account for firms’
holding different amounts of cash, making prices dependent on the non-uniform distribution
of cash policies across firms.
Asymmetric equilibrium implies that a firm’s objective function should have n global max-
ima, where n is the number of groups of firms. Solving for such an equilibrium involves
solving numerically a system of 2n− 1 equations similar to the one for the symmetric equi-
librium case, a daunting task indeed. Given these challenges, I look at equilibria with only
2 potential strategies.
When firms separate into 2 groups with each group holding a different amount of cash, the
equilibrium is defined by three quantities that must be computed: the amount of cash each
group holds (c∗1 and c
∗
2) and the percentage of firms that hold c
∗
2 in cash (η). The three
equations required to derive the equilibrium are given by the condition that c∗1 and c
∗
2 are
extremum points for the firm’s objective function (FOC equation (4) holds for c = c∗1 and
for c = c∗2) and the condition that the firm is indifferent to the choice between holding c
∗
1 or
c∗2 (the objective function is the same at c
∗
1 and at c
∗
2). Moreover, the pricing equation (2)
changes as well to account for the two groups of firms. The detailed equations are given in
Appendix A.
Proposition 3. (a) Any two-strategy equilibrium requires 1 − η firms holding c∗1 in cash
and η firms holding c∗2 in cash, where η ∈ [0, 1]. The quantities c∗1, η and c∗2 solve the
equations given in Appendix A. The solution is an equilibrium iff both c∗1 and c
∗
2 are global
maxima of f(·, p(z, η, c∗1, c∗2))
(b) When it exists, the two-strategy equilibrium is unique among the class of two-strategy
equilibria, which includes the symmetric class as a special case.
(c) If σx > 0, there is systematic volatility σ¯y such that the two-strategy equilibrium degen-
erates into a symmetric equilibrium if σy ≤ σ¯y. The threshold σ¯y increases in L.
This proposition states that there is no overlap between symmetric equilibria and non-
degenerate two-strategy equilibria. When they exist, two strategy-equilibria are unique.
Proposition 3.c, is the same result as proposition 1.c: there is a systematic volatility level
below which there exist only symmetric equilibria and above which there exist only two-
strategy equilibria.
For the particular case where there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty (i.e., σx = 0), I show in
Appendix A that (i) there is no symmetric equilibrium and (ii) any equilibrium requires a
group of firms to hold 0 cash. Thus the solution to any two-strategy equilibrium is obtained
via only two equations (for c∗2 and η).
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In the case of two-strategy equilibria, the comparative statics of average optimal cash in
the industry follow the same patterns as described in Proposition 2. Yet, in contrast with
the symmetric equilibrium, in this case the distribution of cash across firms is not a single
point and it has a meaningful second moment. Its comparative statics with respect to asset
specificity and systematic cashflow volatility generate novel empirical implications.
Proposition 4. Define the “intra-industry variability of cash” (S) to be the standard devi-
ation of the distribution of cash across firms (e.g., for two-strategy equilibrium it is√
η(1− η)(c∗2 − c∗1)2). When two-strategy equilibria exist:
(a)
dS
dL< 0 The intra-industry variability of the ratio of cash holdings to net assets is
positively related to asset specificity
(b)
dS
dσy
> 0 The intra-industry variability of the ratio of cash holdings to net assets is
positively related to industry cashflow volatility
By noting that the range, or intra-industry variability, of cash is positively related to the
systematic volatility and asset specificity, this proposition gives the comparative statics of
the second moment of optimum cash’s distribution, an object that has not been studied
before, theoretically or empirically—see Fig. 2. To understand the link between the range in
cash and systematic volatility, I investigate the case where there is little or no idiosyncratic
shock.
Given a similar cash policy, the more important the common component in cashflow is, the
more likely that firms will survive or default together. In that case, abstracting for other
costs of default not modeled here, a firm is better off holding no cash at all, saving the cost
of cash. By holding no cash, the firm defaults in more states. But in those states everybody
else survives, bailing out the firm. Moreover if it were to carry cash, the firm would never
get to use it to buy other firms because there are no distressed firms when it survives. In
equilibrium, firms follow mixed strategies and separate into different groups where some hold
a large amount of cash and some hold less of it even though all firms are identical ex ante.
Firms use their cash policy to undo the commonality in defaults and survival induced by the
commonality in cashflows.
The reason why firms separate into different groups stems from the effect of commonality of
defaults. However, the costs imposed on firms by commonality of defaults when they follow
similar cash policies are diminished if outsiders have a higher valuation for the assets. In
that case, prices remain high no matter what policies insiders follow. Therefore, firms have
lower incentives to separate into various groups when valuation to outsiders L is high.
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2.4 Empirical Predictions
I obtain a set of empirical predictions based on the results about the existence of various
equilibria and on the comparative statics of the distribution of optimal cash across firms
(Propositions 1 through 4). The predictions concern two key variables: asset specificity and
systematic cashflow volatility. More specifically, I investigate the behavior of average cash
and of the intra-industry variability, or range, of cash.
Prediction 1. The ratio of industry cash holdings to industry net assets is (see Figure 1)
(a) positively related to asset specificity
(b) positively related to the product of asset specificity and industry cashflow volatility
Prediction 2. The intra-industry variability of the ratio of cash holdings to net assets is
(see Figure 2)
(a) positively related to asset specificity
(b) positively related to industry cashflow volatility
These comparative statics are obtained over both types of equilibria investigated. For exam-
ple, industry cash holdings are given by the optimum cash in case of symmetric equilibria,
and by the weighted average of the two optimum values of cash in case of two-strategy, asym-
metric equilibria. Moreover, since only one equilibrium exist for a certain set of parameters,
thus there is only one value of industry cash holdings for a given level of asset specificity and
industry cashflow volatility.
In Appendix A I relax the assumption that surviving firms cannot access external financing
at t = 1. I allow them to pledge α of the t = 2 cashflow generated by the newly acquired
assets. The comparative statics of optimum cash with respect to the two key variables is
shown in Figure 4. Note that Prediction 1 holds.
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3 Data
Asset Specificity Measures
To test these hypotheses I must measure asset specificity, a difficult task.3 The first measure
is based on Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) findings that firms do not branch into industries
where they cannot efficiently use the assets. Therefore, it is natural that industries where
there are more single-segment firms show higher asset specificity. In detail, I assign to all
segments from the Compustat Segments database a value of 1 if, for that year, the firm does
not have other segments in different industries, and a value of 0 otherwise. I take the sales-
weighted average over all the segments in that year and industry. I use sales as a weighting
measure since it is the only size-related proxy available at the segment level. Further, I
obtain the “Segments” proxy for asset specificity by averaging the measure for each industry
over entire time period. This proxy contains information from only the last 15 years (the
Compustat Segments data start in 1990), producing less relevant results if the level of asset
specificity differed between the two halves of the sample.
Another natural proxy for asset specificity is the proportion of intangible assets in an indus-
try. The reason is that out of all assets, intangibles are arguably the hardest to measure,
value, and understand, especially by a non-insider. When a company claims to have a re-
search breakthrough, few from outside that industry may understand whether that would
give them a long-term market advantage or whether they will be shortly overtaken by new
technologies.
Measuring intangibles is challenging. In particular the balance sheet measure misses impor-
tant items such as capitalized R&D or branding. Following the accounting literature, which
recognizes that up to 50% of intangibles may be capitalized R&D, I capitalize R&D by adding
R&D expenses, depreciated linearly at 20% per year. Using capitalized R&D, I construct a
measure of industry intangibles based on industry-level items obtained by summing over all
firm-year observations scaled by CPI. Thus, the second proxy of asset specificity is
CapitR&D+Intangibles =
Ind. Capitalized R&D + Ind. Balance Sheet Intangibles
Ind. Capitalized R&D + Ind. Book Assets
Intangibles not captured by the balance sheet may still be reflected in the market value of
the company. In fact, the accounting literature shows a strong link between various types
of off-balance-sheet intangibles and M/B. The last proxy I use is the M/B computed at the
industry level in a manner similar to the second proxy above.
The last two measures proxy for various other concepts. Before any tests of my theory, I
3See David and Han (2004) for a survey of asset specificity measures. Except R&D, all are survey-based.
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must purge any effects each firm’s M/B, R&D or intangibles may have on its cash policy,
leaving only the effects from the measures’ inter-industry variation. Except for the theory
presented here, no one else explains why the M/B or R&D of other firms in the same industry
should affect one’s cash policy beyond how one’s own M/B or R&D do. My theory predicts
that, after accounting for the effects of intangibles at firm level, the amount of intangibles in
an industry should be a determinant of cash.
Other Data Definitions
I use the Compustat and Compustat Segments data between 1962 and 2004, maintaining
only non-ADR firms from non-regulated industries, non-financial, for-profit sectors—i.e.,
construction (NAICS code 23), manufacturing (code 3), trade and transportation (code 4)
and information services (code 51). I filter the data for missing key variables, to insure
enough observations per industry, and to exclude outliers and observations from firms in
special situations (details are given in Appendix B).
List of control variables
Variable Type Definition
Ln(Age) Trend From start of Compustat records
M/B Time-varying, endog. (Book Assets-Book Equity+Market Cap)/Book Assets
Log Size Time-varying, endog. Ln((Book Assets-Cash&Equiv.)/CPI)
ST Debt/Assets Time-varying, endog. Book Debt Due in < 1 yr/Book Assets
LT Debt/Assets Time-varying, endog. Book Debt Due in 1+ yr/Book Assets
R&D Exp/Sales Time-varying, endog. R&D Expenses/Sales
Working Cap/Assets Time-varying, endog. (Curr. Liab-Curr. Assets-Cash&E)/(Assets-Cash&E)
Capex/Assets Time-varying, endog. Capital Exp/(Book Assets-Cash&Equiv)
Acquisitions/Assets Time-varying, endog. Acquisitions/(Book Assets-Cash&Equiv)
Divid. Dummy Time-varying, endog. 1 if firm paid dividends, 0 othw.
LT Debt/Total Debt Time-varying, endog. Book Debt Due in 1+ yr/Total Book Debt
M&Eq/Assets Time-varying, endog. Machinery & Equipm./(Book Assets-Cash&Equiv)
Intangibles/Assets Time-varying, endog. Intangibles/(Book Assets-Cash&Equiv)
Cash Flow/Assets Time-varying, predet. (Earnings before EI+Deprec.)/(Book Assets-Cash&E)
Firm Cash Flow Vol Time-constant, exog. see text
Cash Cycle Time-varying, endog. see Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998)
Cash Cycle Vol Time-constant, exog. see text
Firms are separated into industries based on their 3- and 4-digit NAICS code. The NAICS
classification is better suited to my theory since the criterion used to group firms is the
similarity of their inputs, while SIC is based on similarity of outputs. I group firms from
manufacturing, retail trade, and information at the 4-digit level, while I group construc-
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tion, transportation, and wholesale trade at the 3-digit level, since a further division is not
meaningful.
Cash is measured as “cash and marketable securities” scaled by net size, which is book value
less cash. The list below details the definition of all other determinants of cash that are
suggested by the prior literature and I include in the empirical tests.
The summary statistics, reported in Table 1, correspond to the rest of the literature, except
that cash is higher and debt lower due to data over the last decade. Moreover, the correlation
among the measures of asset specificity is positive but not very high.
The source of the data on mergers and acquisitions is SDC Platinum. I retain both the
target’s and acquirer’s primary NAICS to classify the transaction as between firms from the
same industry (sale to insiders) or from different industries (sale to outsiders). Further, I
use the ratio of transaction value to book assets of the target as a measure for unit price. I
Winsorize the unit price at 1%. The ratio is aggregated annually for each industry (equal-
weighted) separately for the sales to insiders and sales to outsiders. In unreported results
I do the annual aggregation weighted by the book value of the target, without making a
significant difference in the results.
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4 Strategic Interactions and Empirical Patterns in Firms’
Financial Policies
In this section I uncover empirical evidence about the effects of strategic interaction on
firms’ financial policy. I start by constructing an empirical methodology that accounts for
other, previously documented, determinants of cash. The methodology is carefully designed
to wrestle with the endogeneity and persistence of many of these previously documented
determinants.
I test whether the empirical predictions of the theory about industry-wide patterns in finan-
cial policies bear in the data, and whether there may be some other potential explanations
for the results. Moreover, I look at evidence from the mergers and acquisitions market and
see whether it is consistent with a link between asset specificity measures and industry cash
holdings that is due to the interaction in the asset sales market.
4.1 Methodology
To construct the empirical tests I proceed in two stages. In the first stage I account for
other determinants of cash found in the literature, and in the second stage I test my model’s
empirical predictions. The two-stage approach provides a clearer presentation of the tests,
since in the first stage I focus on the controls, while in the second I account for any unex-
plained industry effects using the predictions of my theory about industry cash. Moreover,
by using this approach I can control for any industry effects unexplained by my theory.
At the first stage, I use an empirical model where cash depends on its lag, a set of control
variables, and a set of industry dummies {αJ}J and time dummies {α′τ}τ .
Cashi,t = γCashi,t−1 + βXi,t +
∑
J
αJ1i∈J +
∑
τ
α′τ1t=τ + ui + i,t (5)
where ui is a firm-specific error and i,t is idiosyncratic error. Some controls—X
v
i,t—are time-
varying and endogenous (e.g., leverage and capital expenditures), while the rest—Xni —are
constant over time. I assume thatXni are exogenous, otherwise I cannot consistently estimate
their coefficients given that Xvi,t does not have any exogenous elements.
Within controls (see the ‘Data’ section for the complete list and definition), compared to
the rest of the literature, I separate leverage into long- and short-term components, on the
grounds that the short-term portion should be more important in setting the current cash
policy of the firm when considering the consequences of not being able to repay it. I also add
the ratio of “long-term debt” to “total debt” as a measure of the term structure of firm’s
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debt. The time-constant volatility measures (of cashflow and cash cycle) are computed for
firms that have at least 12 observations. The rest of the firms are assigned the industry
median where this is computed with respect to all firms in that industry that have at least
12 observations.
To estimate (5), I employ a dynamic panel data methodology developed in Anderson and
Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). This accounts
for the presence of firm-specific error, lag cash, and potentially endogenous and persistent
controls, all of which render any standard empirical specification—such as OLS, fixed effects,
etc.—inconsistent.
Since X contains Ln(Age) and “age” is in fact a trend variable, I de-trend the data first
by regressing cash on Ln(Age). The de-trended measure is used to estimate the coefficients
on time-varying variables in (5) by using the Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology. I
cannot estimate the coefficients on time-invariant variables (e.g., {αJ}J , cashflow volatility)
at this step because the procedure involves first-differencing (5) to get rid of firm error ui.
Estimation is done via GMM with instrumental variables, where the instruments are lags of
Xvi,t and lags of cash. In actual estimation I use 2 or 3 lags as instruments.
Once I have consistent estimates of γ, βv and {α′τ}τ , I construct the residuals
CashResi,t ≡ Cashi,t − γˆCashi,t−1 − βˆvXvi,t +
∑
τ
αˆ′τ1t=τ
I use these residuals at step 3 to estimate consistently the coefficients βn and {αJ}J in a
pooled OLS regression.
The estimation of (5) (i.e., Stage 1) is quite involved, requiring the three steps detailed
above. The consistency of each step is established in Anderson and Hsiao (1982). As
opposed to other empirical studies, here all steps are required since the key coefficients are
the ones on the industry dummies, {αJ}J . They contain, for each industry, the part of cash
holdings unexplained by any other determinant identified in the literature (i.e., X). Since my
theory explains average industry cash holdings, its effects should be isolated in the industry
dummies’ coefficients.
To test the hypothesis about the determinants of industry cash, I estimate the following via
weighted least squares (WLS)4, where the weights are given by the estimated variances of
αˆJ from the previous stage:
αˆJ = λCFV olCashF lowV olJ + λASASJ + λCFV ∗ASASJCFV olJ + err
Hypothesis 1, based on Prediction 1, specifies that
4See Saxonhouse (1976) for why the use of WLS is appropriate in this setting
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a. λAS > 0
b. λCFV ∗AS > 0
I measure the cashflow volatility as the time-series standard deviation of the ratio of the
total industry cashflow to total industry book assets.
To test the hypothesis about spread in cash across firms, I construct a measure of spread
from residuals ui + i,t. These contain the variation in cash unexplained by any controls or
set of dummies. For each year and each industry, I Winsorize at 5% the residuals obtained
at the last step of Stage 1, and separate them into quintiles. Further, for each year and
industry, I subtract the average residual in quintile 1 from the average in quintile 5. This
measure is time-averaged for each industry, generating a set of observations {SJ}J .
To test the hypothesis about the spread in cash, I estimate the following via OLS:
SJ = λ
S
CFV olCashF lowV olJ + λ
S
ASASJ + err
Hypothesis 2, based on Prediction 2, specifies that
a. λSCFV > 0
b. λSAS > 0
Asset specificity and cashflow volatility may contain a few outliers that drive the results,
given the small sample. Moreover, both variables are measured with error. To account for
these drawbacks, in additional tests of the two hypotheses I replace the actual measures
of asset specificity and industry cashflow volatility by semi-parametric, ordinal rank ones.
For each measure, I assign to each industry a rank from 1 to 10, thus generating a derived
measure that has less noise and less of an outliers issue.
4.2 Firm Level Determinants of Cash
This section discusses the auxiliary results about the determinants of cash unrelated to strate-
gic interaction. The results merit attention since I contribute to the literature by addressing
the endogeneity and persistence of these determinants and add a dynamic component to the
framework. As Table 2 shows, the data support a dynamic model of cash, and the coefficient
on lag of 0.4 is very similar to what Guney, Ozkan, and Ozkan (2005) find for other major
countries. Consistent with the literature, older, bigger, and lower-M/B firms do hold less
cash. Separating the debt into its long-term and short-term components looks appropriate
since short-term debt has a higher effect on cash. Moreover, the sign on debt contradicts
22
the hypothesis that firms with more debt hold more cash to be able to service it. Results
may suggest that firms simultaneously allocate some of the extra cash to savings and some
to debt payments.
Working capital, acquisitions, and capital expenditures work in the same way, as expected.
Less-profitable firms hold less cash, showing that an important source of liquid assets is
the current cashflow. Moreover, more uncertainty, expressed through higher volatility of
both cashflow and cash conversion, forces firms to hold more cash. The length of the cash
conversion cycle, the dividend dummy, and the ratio of long-term debt to total debt are not
significant.
Intangibles have a negative impact on cash, showing that they may affect cash at the firm
level through other channels than asset specificity. For example, a high value of goodwill
(included in intangibles) is a sign that the firm made a string of cash-based acquisitions in
the past, depleting its internal resources.
Further, I report a test of the second-order autocorrelations in i,t− i,t−1 since the Arellano-
Bond procedure is consistent only when there is no autocorrelation in i,t. I cannot reject
the null of no autocorrelation.
In gauging the effect on cash of the controls X and the lag, I investigate the correlation
between stage 1 fitted values and actual cash (reported at the bottom of Table 2), where
fitted values are computed using the coefficient estimates and (5), and excluding the indus-
try dummies (Yˆno ind). The squared correlation
5 of 11% shows that, after accounting for
endogeneity, the explanatory power of the usual determinants of cash found in the literature
is not very high, even though I added lag cash to the standard empirical model.
To investigate the explanatory power of industry dummies, I compute the squared correlation
of actual vs. fitted values, where fitted values now include the industry dummies as well (Yˆall).
The squared correlation of 18.8% shows that the industry effects explain as much as 7.8% of
the variation in cash, a number comparable with the explanatory power of all other variables
found in the literature. Thus, industry has a first-order unexplained effect on cash.
4.3 Interaction-Generated Patterns in Average Industry Cash
The main tests of the hypothesis about average cash are reported in Table 3. Each explana-
tory variable is de-meaned and raw variables are further scaled to unit standard deviation.
The dependent variable is scaled by 100; hence the coefficients show the impact of the ex-
planatory variables on average cash in % of book assets.
5Since endogeneity generates non-zero correlation between errors and fitted values, R2 must be redefined.
I use the squared correlation between actual and fitted values as R2 substitute, to investigate the explanatory
power of the model.
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There is strong evidence that the specificity of assets in an industry affects the propensity
of firms to hold cash. All proxies for asset specificity, both raw and rank measures, point
strongly in that direction, as well as the “principal component” and “average rank” measures.
The “principal component” is the principal component of all three measures, scaled to unit
variance. The coefficients on raw asset specificity measures show the marginal effect of a
one-standard-deviation increase given that the cashflow volatility is at the mean. A one-
standard-deviation increase in asset specificity leads to an increase in average cash holdings
in that industry of 1.5% to 2.5% of total net assets. Further, the coefficients on rank measures
are of a similar magnitude once we account for scaling. To understand their significance, we
may compare it to the median cash holdings of 6.7%.
The second prediction, that cash is related positively to the product of cashflow volatility and
asset specificity, is confirmed by two of the proxies (both raw and rank), while the coefficient
on “Intangibles + Capitalized R&D” is insignificant. The average rank is significant at the
3% level and the principal component is significant only at 15% (two-tail). Investigating
the economic significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in both cashflow volatility and
asset specificity leads to an increase in average cash holdings in that industry of .6% to 1.5%
of total net assets. This effect is due solely to the interaction between cashflow volatility and
asset specificity, in addition to the marginal effects. The effect of the rank measure mirrors
the effect of actual measures. Moreover, the Herfindahl index, when added to the model, is
insignificant and does not change any of the results.
The R2 in all models is high, around 40% except for the “Segments” proxy. The unexplained
industry effects account for 7.8% of the variation in cash across firms and years, and the
industry interaction effects are capable of explaining 35% of that, or 2.7% of the overall
variation. This is significant given that all the firm variables and time-series dummies account
for just 11%.
The fact that the industry variables have explanatory power after accounting for the firm
effects show that there are some determinants of cash not captured by individual firm prop-
erties. The explanation suggested by my framework is the strategic interaction with their
industry peers via asset reallocations. The alternative hypothesis of no strategic interac-
tion should result in no explanatory power for the industry characteristics once the firm
characteristics are accounted for. Further enhancing the case for the existence of strategic
interaction effects, a determinant of cash that has no counterpart at the firm level (the prod-
uct between asset specificity and industry cashflow volatility) has explanatory power as it
has been predicted by the theory.
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4.4 Interaction-Generated Patterns in Intra-Industry Variability
of Cash
The main tests of the hypothesis about the spread in cash are reported in Table 4. All
explanatory variables and the dependent variable are scaled as described in the previous
section. Supporting the theory, both industry cashflow volatility and asset specificity are
main determinants of the spread in cash holdings within an industry. The higher the industry
cashflow volatility, the higher the difference between firms that hold a lot of cash and firms
that hold less. The size of the coefficients show that a one-standard-deviation increase in
volatility leads to an absolute increase in the spread of 3%. The mean spread is 23.5% and
the standard deviation is 9.5%, hence the effect is economically important. The results for
rank measures support the ones for the raw measures.
All raw and rank measures of asset specificity, including their principal component, indicate
that asset specificity in an industry plays a major role in determining the gap between
firms with a lot of liquidity and firms with less liquidity in that particular industry. A one-
standard-deviation increase in a measure implies an absolute increase of around 5% in the
difference between firms in the first cash-to-net assets quintile and firms in the fifth quintile.
The size of economic effects is also important from the firm’s point of view. Given the median
cash of 6.7%, forcing an increase of 3− 5% in the gap between firms is rather significant.
The R2 measures are very high as well, between 30% and 60%. Given that the dependent
variable is not the actual cash, the economic meaning of R2 is harder to interpret. It measures
the explained variation across industries in the variation in cash within an industry.
These results use as object of analysis the amount of heterogeneity in cash holdings within
an industry. This object is native to a framework with strategic interactions, and does not
exist in a framework lacking the interaction feature. The fact that the predicted results hold
is a powerful confirmation that the interaction feature is important, and the key observation
that the unit of analysis should shift to the industry level has merit.
4.5 Other Potential Explanations for Industry Patterns in Cash
A first concern is about the measure of cashflow volatility. My theory does not distinguish
between industry-specific shocks and market-wide shocks. One may argue that only industry-
specific shocks matter, since only the financing to insiders is affected by systematic shocks.
In a set of tests reported in the left section of Table 5, I use a market model of cashflow to
extract the volatility of the component orthogonal to the market cashflow. The results using
this volatility are similar to the ones reported for the general case.
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To control for potential time heterogeneity in the relationships among the main variables, I
construct the measures of asset specificity and cashflow volatility for each period. Further, I
estimate the last step of Stage 1 for each period to obtain for each a separate set of industry
dummies. Using these variables, I estimate the tests at each period and aggregate the
coefficients over time. Due to time-dependence in the coefficients, I aggregate them using a
model with first-order autocorrelated errors, where the dependent variable is the time-series
of coefficients and the only regressor is an intercept. The middle section of Table 5 reports
the results. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients confirms previous tests.
Based on the way the Segments proxy is constructed, the results for average cash using this
proxy may be due to the fact that conglomerates hold less cash for reasons unrelated to asset
specificity. While it can be shown algebraically that a bias does exist, all results hold almost
unchanged when I estimate the industry dummies using a sample without conglomerates
(see the right section of Table 5). The results are not affected by the bias, since there is a
counter-bias because the theory is less significant for conglomerates than for other firms.
In further unreported checks, I use only R&D as a proxy for intangibles, without material
changes in results. Additionally, I drop all observations with zero or missing R&D. Even
though results weaken, partly due to using fewer industries, they still hold.
In this section I ruled out some potential alternative explanations, both econometric and
economic, for the main results.
4.6 Industry-Wide Patterns in Net Debt
While the theory was developed in terms of cash, the main conclusions should hold for net
debt as well. There is some degree of substitution between cash and debt capacity, even
though it is not a perfect one. A firm that has to allocate an extra dollar may save part of it
and use the rest to pay off debt. The firm saves in order to have liquidity in states when “debt
capacity” is unavailable, while it simultaneously pays off debt since saving debt capacity is
less costly than saving cash. In that light, I repeat the main tests of the two hypotheses
using net debt. The methodology requires some minor changes: I drop all leverage variables
as controls and add tangibility. The first-stage results are given in Table 2.
Table 6 shows the main results for net debt. They follow the same patterns as in the
cash case. The amended hypothesis about average net debt predicts that the coefficients
on asset specificity and the interaction term are both negative, with results supporting
that prediction, except for the intangibles measures interacted with the volatility term.
Interestingly, the size of the coefficients is almost double that for cash, showing that some
of the effects come from pure debt.
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The hypothesis about the spread in debt predicts a positive sign on both asset specificity and
cashflow volatility. Results confirm this hypothesis as well. The coefficients are of similar
size to the case of cash. Yet, one should not conclude that these results are due solely to
cash because here the dependent variable is something similar to the second moment, so the
effects of the explanatory variables on net debt spread are not the same as the sum of the
effects on debt and negative cash spreads.
Overall, the results are consistent with the view that firms consider cash and debt capacity
as partial substitutes and they pursue similar strategies for both. The strategic interaction
affects not only the management of firms’ cash holdings, but also the management of firms’
debt capacity, which are the two main components of the financial structure.
4.7 Asset Sales, Average Industry Cash, and Asset Specificity
The theoretical explanation for the documented empirical patterns in cash holdings is the
strategic interaction among firms through asset sales. In this section I will investigate some
of the empirical predictions regarding asset sales and their connection with optimal cash
holdings and the key exogenous variables in the model (i.e., asset specificity and industry
cashflow volatility).
In industries with higher asset specificity, a negative shock to industry cashflow should lead
to, on average, lower asset prices. This is a straight-forward implication of the interaction
mechanism. In order to test this hypothesis I construct, for each industry-year, the average
price-to-book ratio for sales to firms from the same industry as the target (sales to insiders)
and the average price-to-book ratio (p/b) for sales to firms from a different industry than
the target (sales to outsiders). Further, I compute the time-average of each of these two
measures over the years where the industry was in an upturn, and the time-average over the
years where the industry was in a downturn. An industry is considered to be in a downturn
if the inflation-adjusted industry cashflow-to-assets is negative.
The price-to-book for sales to insiders during upturns should be (close to) the full value of
the assets, while during downturn it should be lower. The hypothesis about asset specificity
and prices implies that the difference between industry upturns and downturns in the insider
sales price-to-book should increase in asset specificity. Table 7 shows that indeed there is
a positive relation between asset specificity proxies and the difference in price-to-book for
insiders, albeit the relation is significant for two out of three measures. A one-standard-
deviation increase in asset specificity implies an increase in the change in takeover premium
by 100%, which is significant given the median change in price-to-book of 114%.
Since the outsiders are less constrained and have lower valuation for the assets, the price-to-
book they pay should not change too much with the change in industry conditions, and this
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change should be less related to asset specificity. In unreported results, the median decrease
in price-to-book for sales to outsiders is only 85%, as opposed to 114% for sales to insiders.
Further, as Table 7 shows, the decrease in the price-to-book is less related to asset specificity.
The relation is virtually none for two proxies, and it is positive but insignificant for the third
proxy.
The change in the price-to-book for insiders should covary with the optimum average cash
holdings, since both are endogenous quantities and therefore a function of the same exogenous
variables. Indeed, in industries with higher asset specificity we should observe both higher
cash holdings and higher decrease in the price-to-book to insiders. Table 8 shows that the
implied positive relation between cash and the decrease in the price-to-book holds in the
data. An additional 100% decrease in the price-to-book implies a 0.5% higher industry cash-
to-assets ratio. Further, once we add the exogenous variables to the model, there should
be no connection between the decrease in price-to-book and average cash holdings. The
results reported in Table 8 show that this is the case for two of the three measures of asset
specificity.
It is expected to have a decrease in significance in Table 8 of the exogenous variables versus
the standard model because I added an explanatory variable that should be endogenous and
it absorbs some of the effects from the real exogenous variables. Contributing to the reduced
significance is also the smaller sample size, only 50 industries that had enough asset sales to
insiders with target book value data to be able to compute the change in the price-to-book.
The results from this section are consistent with the theory that asset specificity affects the
properties of prices of productive assets, which in turn affect the benefits of carrying cash.
Moreover, the connection between the prices of productive assets and cash is solely due to
the exogenous variables posited by my framework.
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5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how interaction among firms affects decision making regarding
optimal financial policies. It argues that, due to strategic interaction, studies of financial
policies should focus not only on individual firms but also on the industry as a whole.
Empirical results strongly confirm the theoretical predictions about patterns in optimal
cash policies, revealing asset specificity and industry cashflow volatility to be important
determinants of both the average cash in an industry and the within-industry variability in
cash. Further, the corresponding patterns in net debt polices are even more pronounced.
Lastly, evidence about the effects of firm interaction on the market for productive assets
agree with the framework described here.
Strategic interaction adds significantly to our understanding of the variation of cash policies.
It explains an additional one-third of the variation in cash, above what is explained by
interaction-unrelated effects. This is noteworthy given that determinants that result from
interaction do not vary across time or within an industry.
The equilibrium has implications not only for the average of cash carried by firms in an
industry, but also for the variability of cash within an industry. This quantity, a param-
eter of the distribution of cash within an industry, is examined in this article for the first
time. Under the typical single-firm framework, the level of cash should be explained by firm
characteristics, and this quantity would be either zero or noise. However, I show that when
identical firms would survive or default together due to similar cashflows, they attempt to
prevent this by following asymmetric financial strategies. This behavior generates hetero-
geneity in cash policies within an industry, increasing both in the industry component of
cashflow and in the asset specificity component. These two variables explain almost half of
the variation across industries in the difference between the first and fifth quintiles of cash
within an industry.
To control for interaction-unrelated, firm-level determinants of cash found in the literature,
I use a methodology different from that found in most previous studies—one which is better
suited to deal with the endogeneity of some determinants, the persistence in both cash and
its determinants, and the error component structure.
This paper offers a multi-agent model of financing and investment in the presence of external
financing constraints. The endogeneity of liquidation prices due to interaction among firms
should have consequences not only for cash policies but also for firm value, probability of
default, and firm value in case of default. It may possibly lead to industry patterns in these
variables. Exactly how equilibrium affects them remains a topic for future research.
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Appendix A - Theory
Proof Lemma 1
Let p be the unit price at time 1 of distressed assets. The unconstrained $ demand function
for a buyer given the cash-flow CF2 he receives at t = 2 from assets bought:
dCF2(p) =

0 if p > CF2
[0, ∞) if p = CF2
∞ if p < CF2
Given that a surviving insider α receives 1 at t = 2 from each unit of the asset, his constrained
quantity demand function given his cash c1 at t = 1 is
d¯1(p) = min{d1(p), c1α/p}
Since outsiders are unconstrained, their demand function is dL(p), making the aggregate
demand to be
∫
SurvInsider
d¯1(p) +
∫
Outsider
dL(p).
Let c¯1 =
∫
α
1c1α≥0c
1
α the total cash available to insiders. The aggregate demand function is:
D(p) =

0 if p > 1
[0, c¯1) if p = 1
c¯1/p if L < p < 1
[c¯1/L, ∞) if p = L
∞ if p < L
The amount of assets available for sale is the total number of distressed firms and does not
depend on price.
Proof Lemma 2
For each insider α, the cash available at t = 1 is c1α = c + µ + σyz + σxzα. Taking z as
given and using the independence of the realizations of zα across firms, the available cash to
surviving firms is
c¯1 = Eα
[
1
zα>− c+µ+σyzσx
(c+ µ+ σyz + σxzα) |z
]
Using the properties of the normal distribution I get:
c¯1 = N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
(c+ µ+ σyz) + φ
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
σx
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The amount of assets available for sale:
S = 1− E
[
1
zα>− c+µ+σyzσx
|z
]
= 1−N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
Using the market equilibrium condition that D(p) = S and the form of D(p) from Lemma
1, the price of assets is:
p(z, c) = max
(
L,min
(
1,
c¯1
Sq
))
The price does not depend on realizations of zα, but only on the systematic cashflow shock
z and the model parameters.
Available cash strictly increases in c and z, and the amount of distressed assets strictly
decreases in c and z. This implies that exists z¯ and z such that for any z < z the price is L,
for any z > z¯ the price is 1 and for any z < z < z¯ the price is c¯
1
Sq
which strictly increases in
c and z.
The equilibrium in the case of no systematic uncertainty
I consider a particular case where there is no systematic shock to cashflow (i.e. σy = 0).
Since there is no systematic uncertainty, prices depend only on c¯ - they are known at time
0 -, which can be seen by setting σy = 0 in (2). By solving the FOC (4) for c
∗ = c = c¯ and
p given by (2), I get the optimum cash policy c∗.
The form of both prices and the firm’s FOC can be obtained by substituting σy = 0 in (2)
and respectively (4). Thus the equilibrium is the unique positive solution c∗ to
0 = fc(c
∗, p(c∗)) =
(
1
p(c∗)
− 1
)
N
[
c∗ + µ
σ
]
+ (1− p(c∗)) 1
σ
φ
[
c∗ + µ
σ
]
− ξc∗
The price of assets depends only on c and is given by
p(c) = max
(
L,min
(
1,
N
[
c+µ
σ
]
(c+ µ) + φ
[
c+µ
σ
]
σ
1−N [ c+µ
σ
] ))
The form of the pricing function shows that prices depend only on the information available
at t = 0, which is to be expected given that there is no systematic uncertainty.
Further, I will show that there is a unique positive equilibrium and it is symmetric.
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Consider the second derivatives of the objective function:
fc,p(c, p(c¯)) = − 1
p(c¯)2
N
[
c+ µ
σ
]
− 1
σ
φ
[
c+ µ
σ
]
< 0
fc,c(c, c¯) =
1− p(c¯)
σ2
(
σ
p(c¯)
− c+ µ
σ
)
φ
[
c+ µ
σ
]
− v
If σ
p(c¯)
< c+µ
σ
then fc,c(c, p(c¯)) < 0. Otherwise, fc,c,c(c, p(c¯)) < 0 if µ > 0, which I do assume.
Hence fc(c, p(c¯)) is concave for c ∈ [0, σ2p(c¯) − µ] and decreasing afterwards. This property
combined with the facts that fc(0, p(c¯)) > 0 and limc→∞ fc(c, p(c¯)) = −∞, results that the
objective function has, for any given c¯, a unique maximum on the [0,∞) interval. The unique
maximum precludes the existence of any multiple strategy equilibria, since that requires the
existence of multiple maxima. Thus we proved that any equilibrium must be symmetric.
Given that fc(0, p(c)) > 0 and limc→∞ fc(c, p(c)) = −∞, there must be a c∗ such that
fc(c
∗, p(c∗)) = 0. Moreover, given the properties of fc, SOC are satisfied as well at c∗. Thus
a symmetric equilibrium always exists.
Let c∗ be a symmetric equilibrium. Next, I will prove that it does not exist any other
symmetric equilibrium. Assume there is another symmetric equilibrium c∗∗ and WLOG
c∗∗ > c∗. Given the properties of p(c), p(c∗∗) ≥ p(c∗). Given that fc,p(c, p) < 0, then for any
c we have fc(c, p(c
∗∗)) < fc(c, p(c∗)). Thus
f(c∗∗, p(c∗∗))− f(c∗, p(c∗∗)) =
∫ c∗∗
c∗
fc(x, p(c
∗∗))dx ≤
∫ c∗∗
c∗
fc(x, p(c
∗))dx =
= f(c∗∗, p(c∗))− f(c∗, p(c∗)) < 0
The first inequality comes from the previous paragraph results. The last inequality results
from the optimality of c∗. Therefore f(c∗∗, p(c∗∗)) < f(c∗, p(c∗∗)), contradicting the optimal-
ity of c∗∗.
Proof Proposition 1
Point (a) stems directly from the definition of the equilibrium.
The proof for (b) is similar to the proof for the case of no systematic uncertainty. First we
must establish that if both c∗ and c∗∗ are symmetric equilibria and WLOG c∗∗ > c∗ then for
any c > c∗ we have fc(c, p(z, c∗∗)) ≤ fc(c, p(z, c∗)).
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For any given z, we have that p(z, c) increase in c. Further, define
g(z, c, c¯) ≡ N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
1− p(z, c¯)
p(z, c¯)
+
1
σx
φ
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
(1− p(z, c¯))
By definition, fc(c, p(z, c¯)) = Ez[g(z, c, c¯)]−ξc. Given that ∂g(z, c, c¯)/∂p < 0, then gc¯(z, c, c¯) ≤
0 and fc,p(c, p(z, c¯)) < 0. Thus for any c > c
∗ we have fc(c, p(c∗∗)) ≤ fc(c, p(c∗)).
Further, the proof proceeds along the lines of proof for the special case of no systematic
uncertainty.
I do not prove point (c) theoretically. However, it is true over all parameters’ ranges con-
sidered for the numerical solution. An intuitive proof relies on the fact that it exists only
a symmetric equilibrium when σy = 0, and it exists a two strategy equilibrium but not a
symmetric one when σx = 0. Given that the model is continuous, there must be σ¯y for a
given σx such that a symmetric equilibrium exists iff σy ≤ σ¯y.
Algorithm used for the numerical solution to symmetric equilib-
rium for the general case
Let c˜ ≡ c+µ
σx
and a ≡ σy
σx
Combining equations (4) and (2) with the existence of z¯ and z such that p = 1 iff z ≥ z¯,
p = L iff z ≤ z and 1 > p > L otherwise, any symmetric equilibrium c is a solution to
0 =− ξc+
∫ z
−∞
(
1− L
L
N [c˜+ az] + (1− L) 1
σx
φ [c˜+ az]
)
dN [z]+
+
1
σx
∫ z¯
z
((
1−N [c˜+ az]
(N [c˜+ az] (c˜+ az) + φ [c˜+ az])
− σx
)
N [c˜+ az] +(
1− (N [c˜+ az] (c˜+ az) + φ [c˜+ az])σx
1−N [c˜+ az]
)
φ [c˜+ az]
)
dN [z]
Where z solves (N [c˜+ az] (c˜+ az) + φ [c˜+ az])σx = L(1−N [c˜+ az])
and z¯ solves (N [c˜+ az] (c˜+ az) + φ [c˜+ az])σx = 1−N [c˜+ az]
One concern for a numerical solution is how to approximate the indefinite integral. Note
that the quantity under the integral converges to 0 as z goes to −∞. Moreover, the integral
is taken with respect to dN [z]. Hence, for a low enough zl, the integral from −∞ to zl is
less than N [zl] which can be considered 0 for zl < −20. Therefore the indefinite integral can
be transformed into a definite integral, where the lower limit is min(−20, z).
Moreover, note that both z and z¯ decrease linearly with c. For example let u solve (N [u]u+
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φ[u])σx = 1−N [u]. Then c˜+az¯ = u. Since the two integrals become virtually 0 for z¯ < −20,
then any solution satisfies c˜ < u+20a. Therefore I can limit the search for a solution to the
equation above to c ∈ (0, u− µ+ 20σy).
Further, I must verify whether the solution found an overall maximum of the objective
function f(c, c∗). First, I check whether the solution is a local maximum: fc(c∗ − , c∗) > 0
and fc(c
∗ + , c∗) < 0. To check whether it is a global maximum, I note that any other
possible maximum must occur at a level that is not too high, otherwise the effect of ξc
component of fc becomes overwhelming. Over this range, I investigate whether fc(c, c
∗) has
other zeroes and whether the objective function is higher at these extrema.
In conclusion, any numerical solution to the equation above can be numerically computed
by searching, over a bounded domain, for the zero of a function.
Equilibrium definition given a general distribution of cash holdings
across firms:
Equilibrium is a set {D(c), p(F1)}, where D(c) is the distribution with support C = {ci}i
and set of probabilities Φ = {ηi}i of time 0 cash policy across all firms and p(F1) is time 1
distressed assets pricing functional. Equilibrium satisfies:
• insider firm attains its maximum value at time 0 if it holds in cash any c ∈ C, given
that the cash of all other firms in the industry is distributed D(c) and prices at time
1 are given by p
• p is such that supply equal demand given the realization of time 1 cashflows and that
the distribution of cash savings in the industry is given by D(c)
By generalizing the proofs from Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be shown that
c¯1 =
∑
i
ηi
(
N
[
ci + µ+ σyz
σx
]
(ci + µ+ σyz) + φ
[
ci + µ+ σyz
σx
]
σx
)
S = 1−
∑
i
ηiN
[
ci + µ+ σyz
σx
]
The updated definition of the pricing functional can be derived using the formula for prices
from Lemma 2, which is still valid:
p(z,D(c)) = max
(
L,min
(
1,
c¯1
S
))
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The special case of a two strategy equilibrium given that σx = 0 means that Φ = {1− η, η}
and C = {0, c2}. While the equilibrium definition is a specialization of the one above, prices
are not. See the discussion under Lemma 3.
The general case of a two strategy equilibrium and σx > 0, specializes the general definition
of equilibrium and prices to Φ = {1− η, η} and C = {c1, c2}.
Proof Proposition 3
The proof for a comes from the definition of the equilibrium. Further, the equations are an
extended version of the solution algorithm given in the proof of Lemma 3.
An intuitive proof for b has the following steps:
(i) given c∗1 and η, the solution c
∗
2 to fc(c
∗
2, p(η, c1, c
∗
2)) = 0 when it exists, is unique;
(ii) given η, the solution c∗1 to fc(c
∗
1, p(η, c
∗
1, c
∗
2(η, c
∗
1)) = 0 when it exists, is unique, where
c∗2(η, c
∗
1) is given by the condition from (i);
(iii) the solution η to f(c∗1(η), p(η, c
∗
1(η), c
∗
2(η, c
∗
1(η)))) = f(c
∗
2(η, c
∗
1(η)), p(η, c
∗
1(η), c
∗
2(η, c
∗
1(η))))
when it exists, is unique, where c∗1(η) is given by (ii) and c
∗
2(η, c
∗
1(η)) is given by (i).
The theoretical proof for the first step follows the same lines as for the uniqueness of the
symmetric equilibrium.
The intuitive proof for the second step: we want to show that, fixing η, an increase in c1
decreases the marginal incentives to hold cash for the low cash firms given that high cash
firms hold the optimum amount c∗2(η, c1). Therefore the FOC for low cash firms has a unique
solution as long as η is fixed and c∗2 is optimal for that η and c1. To achieve that we must
investigate the effect of a change in c1 on fc(c1, p(η, c1, c
∗
2(η, c1))). First, an increase in c1
leads to a decrease in c∗2(η, c1). Further, an increase in c1 affects p indirectly in a negative
way (through the decrease in c∗2) and directly in a positive way. Intuitively, the direct effect
may be stronger since the change in c∗2(η, c1) should only partially mitigate the effect of a
higher c1 on prices when deriving the equilibrium c
∗
2. Moreover, the direct effect of c1 on fc
is negative when c1 is close to the value that satisfies FOC for low cash firms. Given that
the negative effect of p on fc is bigger as c1 has a bigger increase from optimum, the overall
effect of an increase in c1 on fc(c1, p(η, c1, c
∗
2(η, c1))) is negative and, if it exists, the c
∗
1 that
satisfies fc(c
∗
1, p(η, c
∗
1, c
∗
2(η, c
∗
1))) = 0 is unique.
The last step of the proof notes that if η∗ exists, then for any η > η∗ given that high cash
firms hold c∗2(η, c
∗
1(η)) and low cash firms hold c
∗
1(η), the high cash firms should be worse
off than low cash firms since there are more high cash firms at the higher η. The high cash
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firms may have been better off only if there was some sort of a “network effect”, where if
more firms switch to another group, the better off that group is. This model has no such
effects, and more firms switching to a group make that group worse off compared to others.
For example, more firms holding a lot of cash means that low cash firms will be bailed out
at full price in more states and there are less buying opportunities for high cash firms.
For the proof of c, note that the uniqueness proof above doesn’t rely on η > 0 and a
symmetric equilibrium can be viewed as a special case of the two strategy equilibrium. Thus
there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium and a two strategy equilibrium for 0 < η < 1.
For the range of parameters I consider, the results of Theorem 3.b and 3.c hold true. To
solve for the equilibrium quantities, I follow the details of the proof for Theorem 3.b.
The equilibrium in the case of no idiosyncratic uncertainty
Lemma 3. For the case where there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty (i.e. σx = 0):
(a) There is no symmetric equilibrium
(b) Any equilibrium must have 1− η firms holding zero cash, where η ∈ (0, 1)
(c) Any two strategy equilibrium has η firms holding c∗2 > 0 in cash and 1− η firms holding
no cash, where η and c∗2 solve the equations given in Appendix A. The solution is an
equilibrium iff both 0 and c∗2 are global maxima of f(·, p(z, η, c∗2)).
I will proceed as follows: assume the pricing function as given. Show that, based on the firm
objective function, the symmetric equilibrium is not feasible. Then look for a two strategy
equilibrium.
Firm Problem:
For a firm α ∈ [0, 1], the price p depends on z and the distribution of cash in the market. Both
are not affected by firm α cash holdings. Price takes values between L and 1. Assuming
that the price function is monotonic in z I will show in this section that the equilibrium
distribution of cash holdings is: a measure 1 > 1 − η > 0 of firms hold 0 in cash, and the
rest hold non-zero amounts of cash.
Based on these assumptions there is a level z¯ such that for any z ≥ z¯ the price is 1 and for
any z < z¯ the price is less than 1. Note that σyz¯ + µ ≤ 0 since for any σyz + µ ≥ 0 nobody
defaults (c ≥ 0 by definition) and price must be 1.
The assumption that the price increases in z will be proven in the analysis of the market
equilibrium.
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The objective function:
max
c≥0
f(c) = 1+E
[
1z>− c+µ
σy
1z<z¯(c+ µ+ σyz)
1− p(z)
p(z)
− (1− 1z>− c+µ
σy
)1z<z¯(1− p(z))
]
−ξ(c) =
In case c+µ
σy
≤ −z¯ the first term from the expectation vanishes and the objective function is:
f1(c) = 1− E [1z<z¯(1− p(z))]− ξ(c)
The derivative of f1 is strictly negative. Since there are only costs to cash and no benefits,
the optimum cash when c+µ
σy
≤ −z¯ is 0.
In case c+µ
σy
> −z¯ the objective function is:
f2(c) = 1 + Ez
[
1z¯>z>− c+µ
σy
(c+ µ+ σyz)
1− p(z)
p(z)
− (1− 1z>− c+µ
σy
)(1− p(z))
]
− ξ(c)
Since the quantity under the expectation is always less than c1−L
L
+ const and ξ(c) is
quadratic, there is a csup such that f2(c) < f1(0) for any c > csup. Therefore no firm
will hold c > csup in equilibrium since the strategy is dominated by c = 0. Moreover, for
any zσy + µ < −csup everybody defaults and p = L. This implies that it exists z such that
p(z) = L for any z < z.
Using Leibnitz rule I get the derivative of the objective function:
f2′(c) = Ez
[
1z¯>z>− c+µ
σy
1− p(z)
p(z)
]
+
1
σy
(
1− p
(
−c+ µ
σy
))
φ
[
c+ µ
σy
]
− ξc
There is no guarantee that f2′(c) = 0 has a unique solution. Yet it has at least a solution
given that f2′(0) > 0 and f2′(∞) = −∞.
Proof of Lemma 3.a: Assume the contrary: that a symmetric equilibrium exists. Then
all firms hold c¯ in cash. This implies that z¯ = − c¯+µ
σy
and the objective function f(c) = f1(c)
for any c ≤ c¯ and f(c) = f2(c) for any c ≥ c¯. Given the equilibrium, the maximum of the
objective function must be at c¯. But for any c < c¯ I have that f(c) = f1(c) > f1(c¯) = f(c¯).
Contradiction. c = 0 is not an equilibrium either since f2′(0) > 0 so it exists c > 0 such
that f(c) = f2(c) > f2(0) = f(0). There is no symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3.b: Assume the contrary. If no firm holds 0 cash, then the firm finds
optimal to switch to 0 cash. Any level ci that is held in equilibrium by a group of firms
must be a global optimum, hence f(ci) > f(0). Moreover, 0 > −min(ci) ≥ µ + σyz¯ and
f(min(ci)) = f1(min(ci)) < f1(0) = f(0). Contradiction. It must be that min(ci) = 0.
41
Proof of Lemma 3.c: From the definition of two strategy equilibrium.
Market equilibrium:
We will show that the price depends only on z and the distribution of optimal cash holdings.
Moreover the price increases in z.
If the cash available to surviving firms is greater than the measure of defaulted firms, the
price is 1. If the cash available to surviving firms is less than the measure of defaulted firms
multiplied by outsiders’ valuation for a firm, the price is L. Otherwise the price is equal to
cash available to surviving firms divided by the measure of defaulted firms.
Given that z increases both the survival probability of a firm and its available cash, an
increase in z means an increase in available cash to survivors and a decrease in the measure
of defaulted firms. Therefore the price increases in z, regardless of how much cash each firm
holds. The assumption used in the previous section is confirmed.
Next, I use the results from previous section to derive the price function for the case when
there are 2 groups of firms.
When z < − c¯+µ
σy
everybody defaults and p = L. When z > − µ
σy
everybody survives and
p = 1.
When −c¯ < µ + σyz < 0 the price may depend on z. In this case the available cash to
surviving firms is η(c¯+ µ+ σyz) and the measure of defaulted firms is 1− η. The price is
max
(
L,min
(
η(c¯+ µ+ σyz)
1− η , 1
))
Note that the pricing function p(z) is continuous at − c¯+µ
σy
, but it may have a jump at − µ
σy
if ηc¯
1−η < 1. The monotonicity in z is confirmed again.
In case ηc¯
1−η < 1, µ + σyz¯ = 0. Since −c ≥ 0 = µ + σyz¯, the objective function f(c) = f2(c)
for any c. Given the equilibrium, it must be that both 0 and c¯ are global maxima of f(c).
However f2(c) has a unique maximum. Hence it cannot be that µ + σyz¯ = 0. Therefore in
equilibrium ηc¯
1−η > 1 and the pricing function p(z) is continuous.
Numerical solution algorithm:
To derive the equilibrium solution I use the pricing function derived in Lemma 3. I can write
for any c that satisfies c+µ
σy
> −z > −z¯:
f2′(c) = Ez
[
1z>z>−c−µ
σy
(
1
L
− 1
)
+ 1z¯>z>z
(
1− η
η(c¯+ µ+ σyz)
− 1
)]
+
1
σy
(1− L)φ
[
c+ µ
σy
]
−ξc =
42
= (N [c˜]−N [˜¯c− La])
(
1
L
− 1
)
+
∫ −˜¯c+a
−˜¯c+La
(
a
˜¯c+ z
− 1
)
dN [z] +
1
σy
(1− L)φ [c˜]− ξc
Where c˜ ≡ c+µ
σy
, ˜¯c ≡ c¯+µ
σy
and a ≡ 1−η
σyη
.
Set c = c¯ and the equation f2′(c) = 0 becomes:
0 = −ξc+(N [c˜]−N [c˜− La])
(
1
L
− 1
)
+
∫ c˜−La
c˜−a
(
a
c˜− z − 1
)
dN [z]+
1
σy
(1− L)φ [c˜] (A3)
Take c ≥ 0 as given and solve the equation above for a∗(c) where a∗(c) must satisfy c
σy
>
a∗(c) > 0. The right side strictly increases in a, hence there is maximum one solution. The
proof uses that c˜ ≥ c
σy
≥ a and the derivative w.r.t. to a using Leibnitz rule.
In order to have a feasible solution a∗(c) it must be that the right side for a = 0 is negative
and for a = c
σy
is positive. That means that c must be between c1 and c2 where c1 is the
solution to the equation when a = 0 and c2 is the solution when a =
c
σy
.
The second equilibrium condition states that f2(c) = f1(0). Given that c˜ > −z¯ I get:
−E[1z<z¯(1− p(z))] = E
[
1−c˜<z<z¯(c˜+ z)σy
(
1
p(z)
− 1
)]
− E[1z<−c˜(1− p(z))]− ξ(c)
ξ(c) = E
[
1−c˜<z<z¯
(
(c˜+ z)σy
1
p(z)
+ 1
)
(1− p(z))
]
ξ(c) = (1− L)E
[
1−c˜<z<z
(
(c˜+ z)σy
1
L
+ 1
)]
+ E
[
1z<z<z¯
1
η
(
1− ησy(z + ˜¯c)
1− η
)]
Take c¯ = c and the equation becomes:
ξ(c) = (1− L)E
[
1−c˜<z<z
(
(c˜+ z)σy
1
L
+ 1
)]
+ E
[
1z<z<z¯
1
η
(
1− ησy(z + c˜)
1− η
)]
Explicitly:
ξc2/2 =
1− L
L
σy c˜ (N [c˜]−N [c˜− La]) + 1− L
L
(φ[c˜]− φ[c˜− La]) +
+
1− ac˜
η
(N [c˜− La]−N [c˜− a])− σy
1− η (φ[c˜− La]− φ[c˜− a]) (A4)
Take the solution a∗(c) from (A3) and replace it in (A4). Solve for c ∈ (c1, c2). By construc-
tion c > 1−η
η
.
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The equilibrium in case when project financing is allowed for sur-
viving firms
Starting from the setup described in Section 3.1, I relax the ‘no external financing’ assump-
tion. Namely, the surviving firms at t = 1 are allowed to borrow α to finance the purchase
of each unit of a productive asset. That is to say firms are allowed to pledge α of the t = 2
cashflow of the newly acquired assets in order to finance the purchase.
The pricing function described in Lemma 1 and 2 is unchanged. The firm problem (3)
becomes:
max
c≥0
f(c, p) = EF
[
1F+c>0
(
1 +
(F + c)(1− α)
p− α
)
+ 1F+c<0(F + c+ p)
]
− ξ(c)− c
max
c≥0
f(c, p) = Ez
[(
N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
(c+ µ+ σyz) + φ
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
]
σx
)
1− p(F1)
p(F1)− α−
−
(
1−N
[
c+ µ+ σyz
σx
])
(1− p(F1))
]
+ µ+ 1− ξ(c) (A5)
Thus the only change from the previous equilibrium is the p− α term instead of p. To keep
the analysis simple, I assume that L > α, thus p > α in all states.
The solution to the equilibrium follows the same pattern as for the base case. Figure 4
illustrates the comparative statics of the solution to symmetric equilibrium w.r.t. L and σy.
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Appendix B - Empirical Tests
Data filters
Only entries that have non-missing values for NAICS code, debt and net working capital are
kept. Further, cash/net assets must be between 0 and 1.5, M/B must be between 0 and 10,
assets and sales must be higher than $1 mil, share price must be higher than $1 and the firm
must have more than 100, 000 shares. The limitations on cash and MB are placed in order
to avoid outliers driving the results. In case there are missing data for R&D, acquisitions,
capex, intangibles, machinery and equipment or cash dividends, they are considered 0.
For each firm I require at least 3 valid observations. To distinguish between firms and
industries I require for each industry at least 8 valid firms and 100 valid observations. After
all filters there are 88243 observations and 115 industries left. To compute spreads in cash,
for each industry I consider only the years where there are at least 7 firms in order to have
at least 5 observations left after winsorizing. Further, I keep only the industries that have
at least 8 years with at least 7 observations. This reduces the number of industries to 99 in
tests of hypothesis 2.
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  Figure 1. Theoretical Determinants Of Industry Cash 
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   Figure 2. Intra-Industry Variability Of Optimum Cash 
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  Figure 3. Industry Patterns in Cash—No Idiosyncratic 
    Uncertainty  
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   Figure 4. Determinants of Industry Cash When Project 
    Financing Is Allowed 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Correlations
Panel A: Summary statistics of firm specific variables
Variable N Mean Std Dev 1st Pctl 50th Pctl 99th Pctl
Cash/Net Assets 89188 0.170 0.251 0.000 0.067 1.243
Age 89188 15.110 11.553 1 12 49
M/B 89188 1.635 1.172 0.578 1.246 6.785
Log Size 89188 5.272 1.977 1.396 5.107 10.205
Book Debt/Assets 89188 0.229 0.174 0 0.216 0.691
ST Debt/Assets 89188 0.057 0.083 0 0.026 0.398
LT Debt/Assets 89188 0.172 0.155 0 0.148 0.626
R&D Exp/Sales 89188 0.045 0.255 0 0 0.471
Capit R&D/Net Assets 89188 0.076 0.125 0 0.006 0.563
Working Cap/Net Assets 89188 0.212 0.207 -0.326 0.216 0.655
Capex/Net Assets 89188 0.078 0.071 0 0.059 0.354
Acquisitions/Net Assets 89188 0.019 0.066 0 0 0.333
Divid. Dummy 89188 0.564 0.496 0 1 1
LT Debt/Book Debt 89188 0.647 0.345 0 0.788 1
Tangibility 89188 0.334 0.198 0.027 0.301 0.873
M&Eq/Net Assets 89188 0.143 0.146 0 0.118 0.653
Intangibles/Net Assets 89188 0.066 0.129 0 0.002 0.629
Cash Flow/Net Assets 89188 0.078 0.217 -0.688 0.097 0.408
Firm Cash Flow Vol 89188 0.074 0.061 0.014 0.058 0.315
Cash Cycle 89188 10.313 37.561 -30.734 -2.551 115
Cash Cycle Vol 89188 6.418 9.561 0.920 3.502 64.551
Panel B: Summary statistics of industry level variables:
cash, asset specificity proxies, cash flow volatility, spread in cash
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum 50th Pctl Maximum
Avg. Cash 115 0.080 0.055 0.027 0.068 0.451
Ind Dummy 115 0.175 0.044 0.099 0.167 0.406
Cash Flow Vol 115 0.032 0.023 0.009 0.027 0.181
AS Segments 115 0.540 0.166 0.141 0.534 0.913
AS M/B 115 1.473 0.456 0.919 1.323 3.212
AS Capit R&D+Intangib 115 0.136 0.092 0.006 0.123 0.447
Cash Spread 99 23.52 9.57 9.42 21.61 62.04
Panel C: Correlation among cash, asset specificity proxies and cashflow volatility.
Avg. Cash Ind. Dum. CF Vol AS Segm. AS M/B AS R&D+I
Avg. Cash 0.778 0.372 0.413 0.617 0.388
Ind Dummy 0.778 0.265 0.297 0.604 0.520
Cash Flow Vol 0.372 0.265 0.085 0.174 0.251
AS Segments 0.413 0.297 0.085 0.439 0.213
AS M/B 0.617 0.604 0.174 0.439 0.455
AS Capit R&D+Intangib 0.388 0.520 0.251 0.213 0.455
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Table 2. Stage 1 Results: Models of cash and net debt
Table reports the estimation results of the cash and net debt models based on Arellano-Bond
Anderson-Hsiao methodology. This is the Stage 1 described in text. In model 1 the depen-
dent variable is Cash/(BookAssets − Cash) and in model 2 it is (Debt − Cash)/(BookAssets −
Cash). CashF low is treated as predetermined. Annual dummies, industry dummies, CFV ol and
CashCycleV ol are treated as exogenous. All other variables are treated as endogenous. The proce-
dure has 3 steps: (1) de-trend the data by regressing the dependent variable on Ln(Age); (2) obtain
consistent estimates of coefficients on time-varying variables by using the Arellano-Bond method-
ology on de-trended data using three lags as instruments; (3) obtain estimates of coefficients on
time-invariant variables by regressing the residuals from previous step on the time-invariant vari-
ables (industry dummies, CFV ol and CashCycleV ol). From the AB procedure, I report (a) the
test for second order autocorrelation in the first-difference of errors; and (b), the Wald test whether
all coefficients are 0. I report the correlation between actual and fitted values, which are computed
using all variables, with and without industry dummies (Yˆall and Yˆno ind). Standard errors at step
2 are computed using the robust GMM estimator allowing for cross-sectional correlation in errors.
Standard errors at other steps are computed using White estimator. T-stats in parenthesis.
Variable Cash/Net Assets (Debt-Cash)/Net Assets
Log Age -0.044 0.042
(-42.9) (28.9)
Lag Cash 0.390
(33.2)
Lag Debt-Cash 0.463
(43.0)
M/B 0.008 -0.009
(2.8) (-2.6)
Log Size -0.027 0.107
(-3.2) (10.4)
Short Term Debt -0.507
(-10.1)
Long Term Debt -0.036
(-1.6)
LT Debt/Debt -0.003
(-0.2)
R&D -0.034 0.030
(-1.0) (0.8)
Working Capital -0.294 0.295
(-9.0) (6.4)
Capex -0.322 0.516
(-7.4) (8.4)
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Table 2. (cont.) Stage 1 Results
Variable Cash/Net Assets (Debt-Cash)/Net Assets
Acquisitions -0.450 0.725
(-6.7) (8.7)
Dividend Dummy -0.003 -0.005
(-0.5) (-0.7)
Machin.&Equipm. -0.089 0.150
(-3.2) (4.3)
Intangibles -0.162 0.199
(-4.2) (3.8)
Cash Cycle 0.000 0.000
(0.2) (1.1)
Cash Flow 0.071 -0.130
(3.2) (-4.5)
Tangibility 0.120
(2.3)
Cash Flow Vol. 0.721 -0.974
(28.6) (-30.2)
Cash Cycle Vol. 0.001 -0.002
(6.6) (-12.4)
Annual dummies Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y
Test 2nd order autocorr in ∆ 0.29 0.88
p-val 0.77 0.38
Wald χ2 p-val 0.000 0.000
Corr2(Y, Yˆno ind) 0.110 0.096
Corr2(Y, Yˆall) 0.188 0.197
Obs 72086 72086
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